

Germany's Losing 200,000 Men Each Month, Computation Shows

At This Rate She Can Continue the War Seventeen Months More—Teuton Driving Power Acquired by Her Enemies.

By CYRIL H. BRETHERTON.

The only way in which a war can be won is by destroying the enemy's armies in the field. This can be done in two ways. They can be beaten and dispersed in battle or they can be worn down. The first alternative requires both superior strategy and a superior striking force. The latter superior resources in men and munitions.

In the civil war the South was worn down. In the Franco-Prussian war, the French were decisively crushed in the field. In the civil war France always had superior strategy but never superior striking power, except as the result of some temporary disposition of his forces. He could administer a tactical defeat to the armies of the North but he could not crush them. Grant, on the other hand, by his superior resources, was able finally to wear Lee down. In the Franco-Prussian war, the Prussians had both superior strategy and superior striking power and they were able to defeat their enemies with a few terrific blows.

At the beginning of the present war it looked for a time as if the German armies, by their superior striking power coupled with a daring strategic plan, would crush the French armies and the British expeditionary force driving them eastward against the Vosges mountains. But the strategic plan failed for reasons that are too technical to discuss here and the superior strategy was gradually lost until now it has passed from German into allied hands. But with the complete intrenchment of both armies, there is no longer a possibility of a great strategic stroke, therefore no possibility of either side crushing its adversaries in the field. One or other army must be worn down if it is to be defeated. It is no longer reasonably possible that the Germans can wear down their adversaries on the west front. It is possible but by no means certain that the allies can command a sufficient superiority of men and munitions to wear down the German forces.

The allies' problem on the west front is therefore a simple one. They must wear down the Germans and the quicker the better. If there are still few allies to stagger along the road to Berlin after the last German soldier is lying face downwards in the mud, the war will be won. Of course, the actual fighting will not be carried to this extreme point.

There will come a time—that is to say, if the allies are going to break through at all—that the German line will be driven a hole in the German line, as they did in the recent fighting in Champagne, and the Germans will not have any reinforcements with which to plug the hole. Then it will be a matter of time before the allies do it. That is simply a question of mathematics. Will they have a superiority of men, a superior supply of munitions and guns?

It has been said on many occasions that the allies will need an "overwhelmingly superior" force to break through the German line. That is not so. The losses of the attackers in successful attacks made after sufficient preparation by artillery fire have not been greater than those of the attacked. But on the other hand, a mere preponderance of men and munitions can insure instantaneous victory for the allies. A certain number of men and reserves can defend the German lines and that number has no reference to the size of the enemy forces. Just when the numbers have been variously estimated. Probably 2,000 men to a mile, and half that number in reserve, is the minimum. That would give a total of 1,000,000 which the Germans must keep on their heels.

On the Italian front, the Germans are said to have about 500,000 men. Casualties hitherto have not been excessive on this front on account of the strategic and tactical difficulties of the terrain. But in the last few days the fighting there has been increasing enormously in severity. If the pressure is kept up, the Austrian wasteage will certainly not be less than 50,000 a month. It is not at all certain that the number of men here given—500,000—are enough to hold this front. But they have held it so far, and it may be assumed that they can continue to do so.

On the Russian front it has been estimated that the Germans have 2,000,000 men and the Austrians 1,000,000. These figures are very uncertain. Probably they are too high, though more or less correct when the Russians were being driven from Galicia. As to wasteage, the fighting is more or less open, and the number of prisoners reported taken by either side is far in excess of anything reported elsewhere. The monthly wasteage cannot be much less than 200,000.

What the Austro-Germans are doing in the east is not clear. It is doubtful whether at the present time they have more than 1,000,000 men there. The wasteage will be extremely high. It is doubtful whether they are able to get the assistance of the Serbians and prolong the fight, and the Germans do not abandon it. The losses of the latter will easily amount to 200,000 a month.

We have here, then, a total force of 2,000,000 and a monthly wasteage of 200,000 a month. What reserves have the central empires to meet this wasteage with?

A percentage of the men included in the wasteage find their way back to the ranks. It is estimated that of total casualties an average of one-third are killed, one-fifth taken prisoners and three-fifths wounded. And of these three-fifths, 60 per cent return to the ranks. That would mean that the permanent wasteage should be reckoned at approximately 200,000 a month.

It is estimated that Germany has an enormous percentage, 10 per cent of population being regarded as the usual maximum. Add to this 10 per cent of the population of Austria-Hungary and there is not the least likelihood that the dual monarchy has been able to exceed the 10 per cent limit—and we have a total available force of 14,000,000. How many of these have been lost?

The Amsterdamer Courant, the only paper which seems to keep track of the printed casualty lists of the Germans and is therefore pretty accurate, places the German losses to date at 5,000,000. The Austrians losses cannot, on the same basis, be less than 2,500,000, giving a total of 7,500,000 casualties. Of these, 1,700,000 should be killed, 1,000,000 taken prisoners and 2,800,000 permanently incapacitated. The rest would find their way back to the firing line in due course. The total permanent loss to date, therefore, on this basis of calculation, is 8,500,000. That would leave the central empires approximately 5,500,000 of whom—if we allow a stay of two months in hospital for each non-permanent casualty—1,110,000 will be

temporarily in hospital. That leaves 7,390,000 effective.

Of these, as we have seen, 5,000,000 are figured to be in the firing line or in immediate reserve. That would leave a reserve to cover wasteage of 2,390,000. This reserve will supply the deficiency caused by the calculated wasteage of 200,000 a month for about thirteen months. This makes no allowance at all for the troops that must be used for other than fighting purposes, for occupying conquered territory, for guarding communications, for coast fortifications, etc. On the other hand, it is calculated that about 600,000 youths will, in thirteen months, reach the military age. It has been estimated that Germany and Austria need 1,000,000 men outside of the fighting line. That would mean that they can go on fighting at the present rate of wasteage for ten months.

The difficulty in connection with these figures is that while the percentages are accurate, the total figures of enlistment and to a less extent the total casualties estimated are to some extent guesswork. Thus the Prussian losses as per the published lists are now 2,100,000. As the Prussians comprise six-tenths of the total population of the empire, and as there is no reason to believe that the number of the North but he could not crush them. Grant, on the other hand, by his superior resources, was able finally to wear Lee down. In the Franco-Prussian war, the Prussians had both superior strategy and superior striking power and they were able to defeat their enemies with a few terrific blows.

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Britain Probably Will Have to Give Up Dardanelles Fighting—Russia Has a Limitless Number of Men for Her Armies.

trian forces will endeavor to dig themselves in as they previously did on the west front. It is not at all certain that they can do this. If it is to be effective it must be done all along the line, and in the South it would require as if the British were already on the defensive to an extent that may disable them from taking up and holding established positions. Moreover, it is quite a question whether the incredible amount of material, cement, barbed wire, etc., not to mention artillery, will be forthcoming for the purpose of establishing fortified lines such as have been constructed in the west.

As to the Balkan situation, all sorts of speculation is in order. In the calculations given above, none of the Balkan armies are considered. While the Serbian army has accounted for a large number of Austrians in the past months, the Turks have disposed of an equal number of British and French. In the future, the prospect of a slaughter of Austro-Germans by Serbians and allies and of allies by Austro-Germans and Serbians and allies will probably be the same and the actual effect of all the fighting down there upon the final outcome of the war will be exactly nothing.

If the Austro-Germans succeed in "connecting up" with Turkey, the allies will simply withdraw from the Dardanelles. The Germans cannot take the Turks to fight for them on the east or west front. Nor will the Bulgarians probably be able to do so.

The British undertook the Dardanelles expedition to help Russia. It was successful to that extent. The allies are now fighting in Serbia partly to save the Russians from a possible defeat, partly to save what little has been gained at Gallipoli and partly to try and get Greece and Roumania to join in the fray. Whether they are doing so or not, they are doing so to open a road of retreat for the Serbian forces which will then be moved to some other front is doubtful. Gallipoli is a dead end. The allies are probably the best thing they could do. There will be some massacre in Serbia, but that cannot be helped. Bulgaria will be put out of business as a medium for the allies and Turkey, too, to a large extent.

The talk that emanates from Potsdam about expeditions to Egypt and India are only pipe dreams. An attempt to advance into Asia puts Great Britain in a position to call for the assistance of Japan's veteran army of several hundred thousand men, and Japan for her part will not send her army to take part in the fight.

Personally, I am pretty sure that this is exactly what the allies contemplate doing. It seems a pity to let the Gallipoli fight at the stage of the game, but after all, it is not certain that the Turks are in such dire straits, and a great number of them have been killed that otherwise they would have been. Russians in the Caucasus. And the five or six hundred thousand men, Serbs, and allies, that are there now will make a big showing on one of the other fronts.

Undoubtedly this leaves the allies in the position of having suffered a defeat in the Balkans. A defeat of diplomats and strategists, both, while their stupidity alone made possible. But it is not a defeat that can make any material difference to the final outcome of the struggle. The real victory for Germany in this particular sphere of operations is that she is successfully fighting her way, not to Constantinople only, but to copper, cotton, oil, tobacco, coffee and a number of other desirable things.

Meanwhile, the process of attrition will go on on all fronts, decreasing in severity this winter and recommencing with renewed violence in the spring. The wasteage cannot be replaced will be in men only and in this respect the allies have an overwhelming advantage, as is here shown. But months of attrition and a few months of attrition or comprehensive, no crushing victories or feats of strategy, no economic triumphs, no disintegration of alliances or internal disturbances must be looked for.

One of the most beautiful women of France of the seventeenth century was Ninon de l'Enclos, and perhaps there is no one in the list of famous courtesans of history who presents more complexities of character than does that of Ninon.

She was born in 1620, on October 31, and began her career as a professional beauty when a mere girl. Not content with exerting her physical charms alone, she developed her intellect to an amazing degree, and her wit soon became no less famous than her beauty.

Strangely enough, Ninon was not mercenary. She was generous almost to a fault, and apparently was never induced to receive the gifts which she followed because of vanity. Her society was sought by the most prominent men of her day, and so highly were her gifts valued that Moliere frequently consulted her as a critic of his plays.

She gained considerable distinction as a writer, and her style was marked by a simplicity combined with actual technique that one would little expect of a woman of the frivolous class to which she belonged.

Not alone among prominent men did she have admirers. Her drawing-rooms were frequented by the most distinguished women of the day, and Mme. de Maintenon, who probably was the wife of Louis XIV. toward the latter part of her life, especially valued her friendship. Mme. Lafayette was another one of her lifelong friends.

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IT PAYS TO READ AND USE HERALD CLASSIFIED ADS.

STRAYED—WHITE CAT, NAMED "DANKE". Reward for information, IN D. M. W.

HELP WANTED—MALE. WANTED—3 CARPENTERS, WITH TOOLS, IN D. M. W.

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